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Introduction
! At times, the Environmental Studies can be a consistent lesson about a rather 
dire future our global society is steadily marching towards.  Term after term, studies 
focus on our quite ubiquitous consumption and destruction of oceanic, terrestrial, and 
biological resources in a systematic, efficient manner.  Intensive agriculture increases 
water conflicts, leeches vital nutrients out of the soil, and creates oceanic dead zones 
through nitrogen-rich runoff.  Overfishing threatens fish stocks, while the freshwater 
found on (and underneath) land is diverted and utilized at alarming rates; some of which 
have already caused the depletion of water systems and even large seas.  It becomes 
unmistakably clear that our methods of production and our societal inner-workings are 
unsustainable and need changing.
! Last year, I began working as the Environmental Advocate with the University of 
Oregon’s student government, the ASUO, and quickly learned just how small of a role 
sustainability played in important decision making and public policy.  In the same way 
that big industries will curb pollution or environmentally damaging effects only to their 
sector’s regulation standards, the ASUO would only commit to sustainability with a 
fervor that matched the standards set by the student community.  An argument could 
easily be made that the U.S. government is the same way.  Admitting to our dirty deeds 
and making a shift to a more sustainable society is a responsibility few want to shoulder. 
Perhaps no one wants to face the realities of becoming sustainable.  The public prefers 
cheap, environmentally degrading energy, for instance, and the government is too 
content to shift its subsidization elsewhere and disturb the comfort of the status quo.  
Certainly, though, there must be pockets of cultures committed to sustainability for the 
the very purpose of being sustainable. 
! Two years ago, I volunteered on a self sustained eco-ranch called Rancho 
Margot in the Arenal region of Costa Rica.  It was refreshing to experience a small 
community that understood the downfalls of our means of sustenance.  I found comfort 
in the employment of closed loop systems to re-nourish cropland, sustainable 
management being applied to timber stands in order to provide the necessary 
furnishings for the ranch, and micro-hydroelectric generation fulfilling its energy 
demands.  The land was seen as a dynamic provider that required adjusting to as much 
as it could be adjusted.  A commitment to land stewardship and living within nature’s 
bounds existed more intensely than anywhere or anything I had ever experienced 
before.
! Coming home, it was impossible not to notice the utter lack of such a mentality.  
There were movements in the right direction by various organizations and institutions; 
commitments to increasing levels of recycling, water conservation, and/or the 
distribution of organic produce.  But these efforts were tainted by capitalistic 
motivations.  Many would rather be viewed as an eco-friendly business than actually be 
one.  Personal satisfaction and ethical motivation seemed to hold little ground against 
increasing profits through shifts in public perception.  It can be, after all, cheaper to 
develop a new image than develop a new sustainable business model.  I began to 
notice that holistic approaches to business and lifestyles which viewed sustainability as 
the bottom line, opposed to profit, were far and few between.  Even more, those that did 
exist were often small endeavors dominated by the overwhelming and overbearing 
presence of big business and ever-expanding consumption.   So the question arose: 
should there ever be a switch to the type of sustainable livelihood that I witnessed on 
Rancho Margot, what would be the pressures that would force it.  If ethical inclination 
wouldn’t produce it, and the public was disinclined to mandate it, what might the 
pressures be that initiate a switch to sustainability? 
! After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1990/91, the island-nation of Cuba had 
significant portions of their supply of food, fertilizers, and fuel cut off [1].  Caloric intake 
plummeted and the entire country was threatened with famine should it not act quickly.  
But it did.  There formed an organization called the Cuba Organic Support Group, which 
promoted organic, sustainable farming techniques to be employed in both rural and 
urban landscapes.  The movement quickly reshaped the food scheme on the island.  
Now known as the world’s largest example of self sustained organic agriculture, Cuba 
serves as a case in which sustainable living systems were put in place on a massive 
scale through government intervention and widespread public support.  But this was not 
done voluntarily, it was executed as a response to food shortages—out of necessity [2].
! Necessity, or perhaps economic necessity, may just be the ultimate pressure that 
forces a sustainable metamorphosis.  Just like in Cuba, food security could prove to be 
a catalyst to a sustainable revolution.  It could be that food insecurity, which can include 
elements such as poor food distribution, volatile prices and water shortages, could bring 
rise to a much more sustainable way of life in various regions of the world.  When the 
standard systems of production and distribution fail to meet the needs of various 
demographics, those groups will very likely see self sustained living as a viable 
alternative, or even a necessity.  Similar to Cuba, a self sustained or at least non-
damaging food regime could bring about a way of life that any environmental studies 
student or community member of Rancho Margot could appreciate.  The food security of 
the future, or the potential lack thereof, may just bring about the more sustainable 
standard of living that we environmentalists seek.  
! But now, the question arises as to how food insecurity could arise and become a 
catalyst.  To develop an image of how this might occur, food schemes can be analyzed 
and threats can be applied that might bring about food insecurity. This essay will explore 
the food schemes of two countries: Israel and Ethiopia.  Potential environmental and 
political threats exist which may affect either of the two nations food production (or the 
production of the countries which supply their food).  These threats will be applied and 
extrapolated on various scales in terms of food production losses, price adjustments, 
and food insecurity.  Finally, potential repercussions will be considered.  In order to do 
this, food data from multiple institutions and governments will be used in conjunction 
with scientific literature focused on climate change, environmental degradation, and 
resource scarcities that might affect food production.  These two literatures will be fused 
to produce a qualitative examination of vulnerabilities for both Ethiopia and Israel’s food 
supply, access, and distribution.
Two Nations’ Food
! It is important to note that food data is difficult, if not impossible to ascertain with 
complete certainty.  Even more, it is usually a year or two behind as it takes time for the 
totals from all sectors and harvests to be collected and assimilated onto one document.  
Nonetheless, the following data gives keen insight into the food schemes of Israel then 
Ethiopia.  While Israel is highly developed, Ethiopia has been plagued by poverty and 
famine for decades, giving it a low human development index rating [3].  Both nations 
import food, but Israel’s relatively small size and large population make it very 
dependent on production outside of its borders.  Ethiopia generally produces most of 
the food its population consumes through small time farming.  Through a deeper 
analysis, there forms a depiction as to how food insecurity may arise in two very 
different food systems.
Israel:
! Israel serves as a compelling example of a country with a complicated food 
regime that is highly reliant on the provision of food from other countries.  Its relatively 
small size and large, more developed population leads to a diverse diet richer in animal 
products than developing nations like Ethiopia, but still as equally reliant on staple 
commodities such as grains and cereals.  Lets explore.
Israeli Diet and Consumption
! Israel has a diet rich in vegetables, fruits, dairy products and grains and cereals.  
The Central Bureau of Statistics compiled a food supply balance sheet which serves as 
a consolidated data resource outlining the food products consumed by the general 
population.  It essentially serves as a one stop shop for all data regarding the 
consumption and trade of food throughout Israel.  Topping the list as the main suppliers 
of calories for the citizens of Israel are, in order, cereals and cereal products (33%), oils 
and fats (20%), and vegetables, fruit and potatoes (14%).  Meat follows with 10% and 
milk and dairy products come next with 9% [21].
! Protein supply is slightly different.  Vegetables make up 51% of the protein 
supply, although for this statistic, cereals and cereal products are included in the 
vegetable figure, making up 33% of the 51% contribution.  The other 49% of protein 
comes from live animal sources (29% from meat, 14% from milk and dairy products, 3% 
from fish, and 3% from eggs) [21].  So while grains, vegetables, and oils make up the 
majority of the caloric intake, protein from animal products is vital to the Israeli diet as 
well.
Capacity to Grow and Sources of Food
! What little wheat Israel does grow is entirely rain fed and are vulnerable to shifts 
in annual precipitation levels [4].  The nation’s grain farmers can experience significant 
variations in production because of this, and given the very limited farmland to feed a 
population of almost 8 million, Israel is highly dependent on milling wheat and feed grain 
imports.  In addition, their beef, dairy, poultry, and aquaculture industries are as 
dependent on these imports for feed grain as their citizens are for staple foods [4].  
Wheat and corn are the main components and are sourced from Russia, Ukraine, and 
the United States in varying volumes.  Along with these grains, Israel imports large 
quantities of milling wheat from the U.S., Russia, Hungary, and Canada.  Soybeans are 
also imported as animal feed products, and originate mainly from the U.S., Paraguay, 
and Brazil.  Feed grains make up roughly 74% of the total imports for these three major 
commodities, while milling wheat and soybeans account for 18 and 8 percent of the 
remaining total, respectively.  In total, feed grains, milling wheat, and soybean imports 
amounted to 4.506 million tons for the 2013/14 market year.  It is relevant to note that 
this quantity has grown by 1.7%, on average, every year since the 1998/99 market year; 
a growth rate nearly on par with Israel’s rate of population growth (1.8% per year) [4].
 ! The purchasing levels of each grain fluctuates based on pricing between the 
supplying nations.  Some years favor growth in corn products, while others favor growth 
in feed wheat [4].  Corn byproducts from the U.S. have experienced growth in the last ten 
years, specifically Dried Distillers Grain (DDG) and Corn Gluten Feed (CCF); 
precariously enough, Israel has recently been recognized as one of the largest 
consumers of DDGS and CCF per capita.  But although American DDGS and CCF has 
experienced growth in Israeli trade, U.S. feed grain has lost ground to the robust 
production in the Black Sea Basin.  Israel sees this region as a more fitting supplier for 
feed grain due to its proximity and ability to send small and medium shipments.  Ukraine 
and Russia are the main producers and exporters of grain in the Black Sea Basin [4].
! Contrary to its heavy reliance on other nations for cereal and grain products, 
Israel is much more self sufficient when it comes to fruits, vegetables, and a variety of 
other horticultural crops.  The Israeli Food Balance Supply Sheet reports only a 29% 
dependency on imports for their total fruit, vegetable, and potato consumption.  This 
number jumps to 38% for oils and fats though.  While these levels are much more 
comforting than their 97% dependency on bread and cereal imports, the quantities 
imported still represent a third of the total demand of the country.  MIT’s Observatory of 
Economic Complexity priced the total vegetable product imports into Israel by type, 
amounting to a noteworthy total of $58.9 million dollars in 2011; $27.8 million in 
processed vegetables, $12.8 million in dried vegetables, $11.9 million in frozen 
vegetables, and another $6.4 million in assorted ‘other vegetables’ [5].  Unfortunately, the 
countries of origin were numerous and not traced in these totals.  Oils and fats were just 
as difficult to track down countries of origin for.  That being said, according to FAOSTAT 
data, edible oil imports totaled 83,472 tonnes in 2011, totaling some $158.8 million [6]. 
Total vegetable imports for that same year were 29,903 tonnes, and fruit imports totaled 
30,659 tonnes.  
Threats to Food Security
DROUGHTS AND WATER SCARCITY
! Already, Israel receives about 57.9% of its renewable water from outside its 
borders.  That being said, the FAO’s Aquastat online database on everything water cites 
57.9% as a constant for over a decade [7].  While Israeli surface and groundwater is 
recharging at a rate of 750 million cubic meters per year, the total amount of water 
withdrawn per year has stood above 1.8 billion cubic meters since before 1987 (recent 
estimates place it around 1.954 billion cubic meters)[8].  A clearly unsustainable trend 
emerges, becoming more transparent when looking at the renewable water available 
per capita, which has declined steadily since the 60’s.  It currently stands at 99.2 cubic 
meters per person per year, only about 60% of what it stood at in 1992, the year I was 
born [9].
! All this being said, Israel has done extremely well in increasing water efficiency.  
The nation now produces $90.5 per cubic meter of freshwater withdrawn; a number that 
is over double the $43.5 produced with every cubic meter consumed in 1992.    While 
this is a wonderful feat, the issue remains that Israel’s food production levels are 
extremely vulnerable to water shortages.  For instance, using data from Israel’s Central 
Bureau of Statistics, average prices of February tomatoes were 33% higher during the 8 
year drought between 2005 and 2012[10] as compared to the prices from 1996-2004.  
January cucumbers were 59.7% higher.  March lettuce prices were 30.9% higher, and 
February apple prices were 14% higher[11].  The World Bank estimates that Israel had 
about 28% of their agricultural land irrigated in 2009.  The remainder relies on 
consistent rains [12].
! Based on predictions by NOAA, Israel can expect to see a decrease in annual 
rainfall of 1-2 inches by the end of the 21st century.  Another study suggests that the 
rainy season will be shortened and the distribution of rainfall will adjust from region to 
region.  Specifically, the boundary between the arid southeast and the wetter northwest 
will retreat northward, reducing the overall size of sufficiently rain-fed land.  Volatility of 
rainfall patterns were also predicted to intensify due to 
rising global temperatures [13].  This leaves the productivity 
of Israel’s agricultural sector in a precarious situation as it 
moves into the future.
! Not just domestic production is threatened though.  
Nearly the entirety of their grain supply is being sourced 
from the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia, regions which are 
also expected to experience shifts in rainfall patterns and 
higher volatility.  This could greatly affect the price of 
Israelis’ staple food as well as that which feeds their 
massive meat and animal product economy: grain.  To the 
right is a map from the EPA outlining the expected rainfall 
changes in the U.S.’s breadbasket, the great plains.  The 
two on the following page show where corn and Red Winter 
Figure 1: Rainfall changes in the Great 
Plains. (EPA 2013) [22]
Wheat are grown. 
! As you can see with a little inspection of the maps, the corn belt will likely see 
increases in rainfall by around 5-30%, depending on the scenario, while the wheat belt 
will experience decreases of 5-35%.  Just this year, the Wall Street Journal reported a 
price spike of 3.5%, the biggest in three years, blaming the regional droughts across the 
nation for the jump [14].  If the scenario outlined by the EPA plays out and events like this 
year’s drought continue and intensify, the price of those harvests will very likely rise due 
to increased costs of irrigation and/or a shrinking 
supply as crops fail.  This will force Israel to either pay higher prices, or find alternative 
sources.
! Russia and Ukraine are not exactly secure sources of grain either.  NOAA 
estimates predict the average precipitation across nearly all of Ukraine will drop by 1-3 
inches by the end of the 21st century.  The southern regions, where the majority of the 
agriculture is grown in the country, is predicted to have the most severe drop in rainfall.  
Russia grows most of its wheat along its border with Kazhakstan and Ukraine, with the 
heaviest production being right along the borders [15].  In the growing regions around 
Ukraine and between the Black and Caspian Seas, there will likely be a decrease of 
around 1-4 inches, while the regions more to the north and spreading east are expected 
to get an increase—1-3 inches as projected by NOAA [16].  Fittingly, the World Bank 
predicts that the southeastern region bordering Ukraine will experience a 10-20% drop 
in agricultural yields while the north and western growing areas could experience an 
increase of 5%.  There are massive tracts of land even further north that are expected 
to also become more agriculturally productive.  So Russia could shift agricultural 
production northward to make up for losses in the south, should it so choose.  Ukraine, 
on the other hand, doesn’t have this option.
POPULATION
! Israel has a population growth rate of 1.8%, more similar to developing nations 
than developed, and is expected to reach 10-12 million inhabitants by 2035 as reported 
by their Central Bureau of Statistics.  Having already started, the global grain prices will 
likely continue to rise as populations grow and arable land becomes more and more 
Figure 2: U.S. Wheat Belt. (USDA, 2010) [23] Figure 3: U.S. Corn Belt. (USDA, 2010) [24]
scarce.  The USDA’s Annual Grain and Feed Report from 2011 warned of such 
conditions, suggesting that Israel would likely have to transition many of their fields from 
growing horticultural crops over to wheat production.  If done so, it was estimated that 
national production could increase by 50,000 tons [4].   While this figure is rather large, it 
is rather insignificant in its ability to reduce the volume of imported grain that Israel 
currently relies on.  With their imports standing at 4.506 million tons, 50,000 additional 
tons of wheat would only reduce the nations dependency on outside sources of wheat 
by 1.1%; just a drop in the bucket, really [4].  So although there is an opportunity for 
Israel to fill in a small gap in a grain shortage, it will be unable to cover the gap should 
the U.S., Ukaraine, and Russia encounter serious crop failures and refuse to sell their 
goods at regular prices.
DESERTIFICATION OF US, RUSSIAN, AND UKRAINIAN SOILS
! In addition to volatile rainfall patterns, the American and European breadbaskets 
are also threatened by desertification of their soils.  The map below, produced by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, shows the global distribution of degraded soils in 1998.  
While it is slightly dated, it does provide good insight into the regions which have 
degraded potential for agricultural yields.  The great plains has a vast area which has 
very high vulnerability to desertification, while the Black Sea Basin has moderate, high, 
and very high vulnerability.  In both regions, vital organic matter and nutrients could be 
lost and crop health would suffer.  As crops struggle or potentially fail, prices will rise as 
supply falls, posing another serious risk to the affordability of Israel’s imported wheat.  
Not only is their imported wheat under threat, but as made clear by the map, the state of 
Figure 4: USDA, 2003 [25]
Israel also has high and very high vulnerability to desertification.   This could lead to 
intense decreases in yields of the fruits and vegetables that they produce for local 
consumption and exportation.  The result would be higher costs of food for the Israeli’s 
and a smaller agricultural GDP.
POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION IN BLACK SEA BASIN
!
! It is no secret that Russia and Ukraine have been on bad terms these last few 
months (February-May, 2014).  Together, although not jointly, they control what is known 
as the Black Sea Basin, which is commonly referred to as the ‘breadbasket of Europe’.  
The United States’ Department of Agriculture estimated that together, 16.7% of global 
wheat exports originate from the two countries, some of which is destined for Israel.  
Upon the news of the Russian invasion into the Crimea peninsula, there was a spike on 
global commodity prices [17].  The U.K.‘s Telegraph issued a warning of rising wheat and 
grain costs should the conflict successfully choke off trade routes on the 2nd of March, 
2014 [18].  Should the conflict succeed in doing so, Israel will be forced to find an 
alternative source of grains.
FERTILIZER PRICE BUMP
! Fertilizer, similar to gasoline and oil products, 
is synthesized from finite resource reserves.  
Nitrogen, Phosphorus, and Potassium, or NPK, are 
the three vital elements of fertilizer production.  
Nitrogen is plentiful in our atmosphere and can be 
synthesized easily.  Potassium Oxide and 
Phosphorus Pentoxide are derived from potash and 
phosphate, respectively, and cannot be replaced, 
made, or substituted.  Precariously enough, they 
are also two compounds that are absolutely vital 
for all processes that drive every kind of plant 
growth.  Just like peak oil, current experts have 
been speaking up about the increasing rarity of both potash and phosphate and how 
their dwindling supply could both raise prices and, upon collapse, cause massive 
decline in crop yields.  The chief investment strategist and co-founder of GMO, Jeremy 
Grantham, explains that 70% of the world’s potash reserves are in Canada and 85% of 
all high-grade phosphate mines are in Morocco’s contested lands of the Western 
Sahara [19, 20].  
! Index mundi has compiled data from the World Bank to show the price of fertilizer 
over time, shown in the graph to the right.  Clearly, a price spike exists centered around 
the food price increase of 2008.  This is concerning given that fertilizer use increases 
our societies’ carrying capacity.  More food means more people can live and eat, but 
once the very resource that facilitates this runs out, a crash in our carrying capacity is 
possible.  This will be discussed in more depth later.
Figure 5: Global Monthly Fertilizer Prices. (Index-Mudi; 
World Bank) [26]
! As noted before, Israel shifts 
their markets to the cheapest grain 
harvests, altering the quantities of 
grain bought from the U.S., Ukraine, 
and Russia depending on pricing.  
This speaks to their desire for cheap 
imported grain.  Should the depletion 
of potassium and phosphate fertilizers 
become a reality as many experts 
believe, Israel will likely experience 
price increases in their imported 
grain, as well as the domestically produced 
animal products which rely on feed grain 
imports or fertilizers themselves.  In figure 7, 
you can see a graph of the monthly average of U.S. wheat prices from 2000-2013, as 
sourced from the University of Illinois’ College of Agricultural, Consumer and 
Environmental Sciences [28].  
! Comparing to the price of fertilizer above, it becomes clear how the price of 
fertilizer rises with the price of food.  Even more, both fertilizer and wheat prices have 
yet to drop back to the levels in the early 2000’s since the 2008 spike.  Should another 
price surge in fertilizers bring with it higher food costs from the globe’s breadbaskets, 
Israel could very easily see another doubling of food prices.  Domestically produced 
foods could also see price bumps, as the average amount of fertilizer used per hectare 
of arable land stood at 200 kilograms in 2010 [29].  With such a clear dependency, a less 
affordable supply of fertilizer could result in the inability to buy for the less affluent 
demographics.  
CLIMATE CHANGE
! Climatic swings have already shown just how volatile the price of vegetables are 
in Israel markets when production droops.  A winter storm in December of 2013 sent 
price shocks through the local produce markets, causing the cost of commonly eaten 
fruits and veggies like tomatoes, lettuce and cucumbers to rise by 200-400% [30].  In an 
effort to preserve a relatively low cost of living, the Israeli Agriculture Ministry dropped 
the tariffs on imported produce to help “reduce the price of a family’s food basket,” says 
Finance Minister Yair Lapid.  This severe inflation of prices is indicative of the 
susceptibility that Israeli food markets have to the type of disturbances climate change 
is expected to bring.  In Israel’s National Report on Climate Change, as prepared by the 
U.N.’s Framework Convention on Climate Change, it is reported that increased 
temperature variability, volatile rain patterns, and increased heat and desertification can 
be expected in the next century [31].  Rains are expected to come in shorter durations 
and with higher intensities, causing erosive flash floods and further desertification.  
Israel’s crops which aren’t heat or cold sensitive will likely struggle with the seasonal 
shifts while nearly all crops will need supplemental fertilizer should desertification occur.
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Figure 7 (University of Illinois’ College of Agriculture) [28]
Ethiopia
! Ethiopia has a highly diverse geography that equates to a range of agricultural 
productivity levels due to differences in altitude and precipitation.  Despite an increase 
in studies performed within the country, accurate data is especially difficult to ascertain 
as the majority of farms in Ethiopia are smallholder farms of modest size (a hectare or 
less), and are a means to self-sustenance for the owners [32].
Ethiopian Diet and Consumption
! A 2011 study from the International Food Policy Research Institute titled 
‘Foodgrain Consumption and Calorie Intake Patterns in Ethiopia’ calculated what 
percentage of Ethiopians’ budget went towards buying various food products.  They 
found that on average, 46% of a family’s budget went towards the purchase of cereal 
products, nationally [33].  In rural areas they made up around 54% of the diet, followed 
behind by Ensets at 17.5% and then vegetables at 14.5% [34].   While these values are 
sensitive to both price swings and income distributions, cereals make up the majority of 
the Ethiopian diet in all regions.  That being said, a 2009 study from the Ethiopian 
Journal of Health Development found that Ethiopian urbanites had significantly lower 
levels of vegetable cultivation and consumption [35].  
! Ethiopia’s Grain and Feed Annual Report, prepared by the USDA for the Global 
Agricultural Information Network reported that the exportation of grains was banned in 
the country.  The International Food Policy Research Institute facilitates a Food Security 
Portal, which provides “comprehensive and detailed information country-by-country on 
food policy,” as the site promotes [36].  On their Ethiopian profile, they cite the country as 
having produced around 7 million metric tons of wheat, maize, rice, and soybeans in 
2010.  Wheat and maize make up the majority, with 3 and 3.9 million tons of production 
apiece, respectively.  Rice production trails with just 71,000, and just under 8,000 tons 
of soybeans were produced [37].  With the nation’s history of food insecurity, all grains 
are essentially restricted within the borders to feed the Ethiopian population, though.  
Some small exports of soybeans do exist but all other commodities’ exports are 
negligent.  
! Imports are also highly regulated and essentially controlled by the government 
through restricted use of foreign currency [32].  Unlike the nation’s exports, the imported 
wheat, maize, rice and soybeans are noteworthy, but uncertain.  The values waver 
inconsistently from year to year, although rice has grown significantly, tripling in volume 
between 2009 and 2011 (from 22,287 tonnes to 71,405).  Wheat and cereal imports 
were also high last year (at 1,654,280 tonnes and 1,850,840 respectively), although 
they had decreased slightly from their peaks in 2009.  Nonetheless, they too had 
doubled in volume between 2007 and 2009, while corn imports spiked and fell 
dramatically during the same general period.
Sources of Food
!
! Overall, Ethiopia is one of Africa’s largest grain producers, and also boasts one 
of the largest livestock herds in Africa despite its feed grain industry still being in its 
infant stage [32].  Nonetheless, the country has experienced food insecurity for decades 
[38].  Wheat, teff, maize, barley, and sorghum make up the five major cereal grains of 
Ethiopia’s food economy.  Local production feed the small-time farmers who harvest it 
and also portions of the urban populations through local markets.  Another major crop is 
the Enset, a large yielding, carbohydrate intensive crop that belongs to the banana 
family which is grown mostly for local consumption and trade amongst small farms.  
Measures of total production are dated and flawed, but range from 2.4 million to 5 
million metric tons a year [40].  Vegetables like potatoes, garlic, shallots, and chillies are 
grown on rain-fed plots, while vegetables requiring more water like tomatoes, spinach, 
and carrots are mainly saved for the irrigated land.  This being said, very little amount of 
farmland in Ethiopia is irrigated.  Nonetheless, vegetable yields have been steadily 
rising since 1993 and rested at just over 1.2 million metric tons in 2009 [41].
Price of major commodities:
! Certainly, Ethiopia has vastly improved their food security programs since the 
days of famine in the 70’s—a point that will be expanded on later in the ‘Resiliency 
section of this essay.  Nevertheless, an estimated 40% of the population is still 
undernourished [37] and famines have unfortunately and sporadically occurred since the 
devastating times of the 70’s and 80’s.  Despite the government’s great undertaking in 
increasing food security, price volatility for staple foods still exists.  With the onset of the 
2008 global recession, domestic prices on grains began to climb, doubling within 
months as institutions and programs struggled to flood the market with lower-priced 
imports [42].  During the same period, global wheat prices were also soaring, increasing 
by around 75% in a single year starting in April 2007 [43].  It is important to note, though, 
that the global market price spike came before the Ethiopian price spike, so there is a 
short lag in the pricing whiplash.  Also important is that although delayed, the Ethiopian 
price spike was slightly more extreme than the global one, indicating that Ethiopian 
markets might be more fragile than global ones.
!
Threats to Food Seurity
DROUGHT
! The future of Ethiopia’s rain supply is not as as dire as many other African 
nations.  While the northern third of the country is expected to see a drop of 1-4 inches, 
with the 4 inch drop only occurring in a small pocket in the north corner, the south is 
actually expected to receive more rain by the end of the 21st century [16].  Up to 6 inches 
of additional rain could come in a pocket in the southwest, while the majority of the 
southern end of the country should see an increase of 1-5 inches of rain, excluding the 
arid region approaching the horn of Africa.  Nonetheless, a few extra inches on average 
doesn’t mean that the country will become immune to droughts.  As the BBC and Time 
Magazine reports, Ethiopia has been experiencing a cycle of droughts and famines for 
decades [44, 45].  While the expected increase in rains certainly won’t hurt, Ethiopia is 
expected to experience acute droughts and increased rainfall variability in the future 
which could undermine their agricultural productivity [96].  
! Just like in the past, this has the potential to cause famine and even political 
destabilization through rising food prices.  The 1984-1985 famine within Ethiopia caused 
1 million deaths, and while a civil war exacerbated the situation, drought was seen as 
the main driver.  From 1981 to 1985, average grain prices rose by a factor of 3, 4, and 5 
for the three staple grains [45].  Since then, food aid has been at least slightly successful 
in avoiding similar scenarios, but the aid coming in is shrinking in volume.  In 2012, 
Ethiopia’s Grain and Feed Annual Report, prepared by the USDA for the Global 
Agricultural Information Network, reported that domestic wheat prices in Ethiopia have 
risen due to dwindling food aid in the last few years, specifically in wheat imports.  This 
has reduced the countries emergency reserves, reducing the supply and driving prices 
up [32]. 
DESERTIFICATION
! 85% of Ethiopia’s land mass is considered to be at least moderately degraded 
[46].  The amount of severely degraded soils sits at around 2 million hectares, and nearly  
all of the nation is vulnerable to wind and water erosion, as well as salinization and 
alkalinisation.  The economic effects of desertification were estimated by four entities 
and cited in the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification’s 2013 report titled 
Economic and Social Impacts of Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.  As a 
percent of total Agricultural GDP (AGDP), desertification was estimated to cause a loss 
ranging from 2-6% of the total AGDP of Ethiopia [47].  These numbers are contested, 
though.  In a 2001 report in the Economic Policy and Sustainable Land Use contribution 
to Economics, Michiel Keyzer and Ben Sonneveld found that there wasn’t a strong 
correlation between land degradation and fertility and crop yields.  This was believed to 
be because of a couple reasons.  One being that soil degradation usually occurs on the 
already poorest of soils.  Also, degradation is usually compensated for through the 
application of fertilizer [48].  The range of conclusions in the field show how difficult it can 
be to secure reliable estimates of how desertification detracts from agricultural 
productivity.  One thing is for certain though: if productive soils erode, agriculture will 
suffer without additional inputs.  After all, crops must attain their nutrients from 
somewhere.
FERTILIZER PRICE BUMP
! Fertilizer is often heralded as a solution to desertification.  It can replace lost 
nutrients, and also boost production for a number of varieties of crops [49].  Currently, its 
use in Ethiopia is low, but it has been rising steadily since 2003 when consumption 
stood at 5.7 kg per hectare.  In 2010, that number reached 22.8 kg per hectare of arable 
land [29].  Given that 14.56% of Ethiopia’s 1.127 million square kilometers is arable land, 
the total number of hectares of agricultural land falls at 16,409,120 [50].  At 22.8 kg per 
hectare, Ethiopia could very well have used around 3.74 x 10^3 metric tons of fertilizer 
in 2010.
! But this number will likely increase.  There is currently a large effort being made 
by the Ethiopian government to remove large pastoral populations and small time 
farmers from large tracts of fertile land in order to open various regions up for 
investment [51].  Foreign bodies have been buying or setting up leasing contracts with 
the government for these lands, mostly for the purpose of installing large-scale 
agriculture networks for producing cash crops such as sugar-cane [52].  India is one of 
the major purchasers of land in Ethiopia, although China has also been a major investor 
in the nation and continent as a whole [53].  These investments have brought little returns 
to Africans, it may be worth noting.
! Already, agribusiness is gearing up to take over new, major markets in Ethiopia.  
Several fertilizer manufacturers have already performed full market analyses, estimating 
just how much fertilizer could be used to boost Ethiopian production [54].  In the Ethiopia 
Fertilizer Assessment, as commissioned and funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) under the Feed the Future initiative, estimates were 
made on the amount of Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus Pentoxide (P2O5), and Potassium 
Oxide (K2O) that the top 5 grain crops would remove from the soil.  They were able to 
discern an approximate amount of fertilizer needed to maintain yields and the soils 
health.  In total, it was estimated that Teff, Maize, Sorghum, Wheat, and Barley removed 
253.1 x 10^3 metric tons of the three nutrients from Ethiopian farmland every crop cycle 
[55].  The authors used a specific multiplier to find the amount of fertilizer needed to 
replace the leeched nutrients. Using the average of the two ratios used, it was 
estimated that 504.2 x 10^3 metric tons of fertilizer would be needed to replenish the 
soils [49].  An upward trend in fertilizer use and dependency becomes clear, and just like 
Israel, Ethiopia’s vulnerability to a spike in fertilizer prices can be seen as a serious 
threat to food security.
INADEQUATE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
! Ethiopia’s transportation and distribution network is still heavily reliant on the 
roadways that spread across the nation [56].  The Encyclopedia of the Nations estimates 
that around 75% of the farms in Ethiopia have more than a days walk to the nearest 
road, forcing the majority of the produce from farms to be carried by pack animals.  
While the major urban centers are efficiently connected, great challenges still clearly 
exist for rural communities’ access to roadways [57].  Some waterway transport is used 
on the Baro river, but all oceanic shipments must come in through Djibouti’s port [57].
! The road network certainly has its flaws, but the rail network is essentially non-
existent.  There is a single line from the nation’s capital, Addis Ababa, to neighboring 
Djibouti [57].  China has, however, pledged a $1.5 billion dollar investment in order to 
build a railway from Ethiopia’s northeastern potash mines into Addis Ababa [58].  Even 
more, the Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC) has also started construction on a 
5,000km system of railways which will connect most all of Ethiopia.   Abebe Miheretu, 
who serves as the head of public relations for the ERC, explains that the railway will 
help “connect Ethiopia economically and increase access for imports and exports” [59].  
With these new projects on the horizon, Ethiopia’s ability to distribute goods and vitalize 
their economy will increase with time; a phenomena the rural populations will 
undoubtedly welcome after being plagued by relatively poor transportation systems for 
decades.
CLIMATE CHANGE
! A study performed on 3,000 household crop yields across four major regions of 
Ethiopia for the 2011/12 harvest year found that yields varied from farm to farm.  While 
78% of farmers reported that they experienced similar yields to previous harvests, 
others noted a much lower yield (18%), and an even smaller proportion saw a rise in 
yields (4%).  These decreases and increases were fairly concentrated, though, seen 
almost entirely in just 2 crops for increased yields and 3 crops for the decreased yields.  
The researchers weighed in on the experience of the farmers as to the sources of these 
variations.  Gains were attributed to plentiful precipitation by 64% of the respondents, 
while 23% of them attributed their gains to fertilizer use.  Declines were of similar 
nature, with 62% of farmers blaming poor rainfall.  The runner up was instead pests and 
disease, where 16% of farmers found their crops had been attacked.  And although this 
was mainly rampant in vegetable and oilseed growers, it also was reported to have 
affected between 9-20% of cereal crops [60].
! The study makes clear how effectively climatic fluctuations, specifically in rainfall, 
can reduce agricultural yields in Ethiopia.  With climate change poised to intensify 
precipitation volatility and uncertainty, Ethiopia’s farmers will likely bear the brunt of a 
climatic slap to the face [62].  A stable water supply will simply be less and less available 
as extreme events that once had low probabilities of occurring increase in frequency.  
But although rainfall variability and changes in the average rainfall are unnerving, floods 
are particularly threatening to crops in terms of outright damage [63].  They have the 
ability to wipe away fields if powerful enough.  These climatic threats will ultimately 
undermine economic growth along with food security, and, should a severe food 
shortage occur, much progress in reducing poverty and achieving economic stability 
could be lost [63].  
Resiliency!
! There exist a number of threats to both Israel and Ethiopia’s food schemes and 
food security that, based on experts’ estimates, will likely affect them both within this 
century.  But before applying each one, it is necessary to speak to both of the nations’  
food systems’ efficacy for resilience.  Resiliency describes the amount of change a 
system can undergo before a change in the system itself takes place.  Resiliency can 
also refer to the ability to self-organize.  In this sense, an adaptable scheme is also a 
resilient one.  Adaptability can be facilitated or restricted, as can the ability to withstand 
shocks and changes.
! Nearly all systems have an aspect of resiliency, as well as thresholds.  When a 
system absorbs enough change, it eventually is forced to alter its structure.  It will pass 
a point of pressure that forces it to do so.  This pressure point is what is known as a 
threshold.  In terms of food security and food schemes, it is difficult to confidently define 
a threshold that when crossed, forces a society to falter under the pressures of food 
insecurity.  Even more mysterious is how exactly a society will respond or alter in 
structure or character once these thresholds are passed.  One thing is for certain 
though, food scarcity does have the power to reshape societies.  Food security policy, 
international food aid and relief, and massive food reserves help increase resiliency to 
food shortages and price spikes.  But at the same time, global climatic shifts, resource 
scarcities, and political destabilization can all compound to produce a daunting threat to 
food systems.  In the following sections, the buffers that each nation have against the 
aforementioned threats are explored.
!
Israel
! Israel has 750 million cubic meters of water being naturally produced within their 
borders, recharging the groundwater sources that they use for their urban population as 
well as their agricultural sector [8].  While this is certainly not equivalent to their 
consumption, it does serve as a safeguard in the case of water scarcity.  Should a water 
shortage emerge, the nation will assuredly have at least 750 million cubic meters of 
water to tap into each year.  A more promising phenomena is that their agricultural 
sector’s water efficiency has been improving immensely in the last couple decades [64].  
In 1988, the equivalent of $33 was produced per cubic meter of fresh water withdrawn.  
In 2011, that figure stood at $90.5.  Israel is hailed as another (perhaps superior) silicon 
valley [65], with a booming startup economy centered around technological innovation.  
Water conservation technology is one of their major focuses.  As the Washington Post 
even reports, ‘Israel knows water technology’, and it will likely continue to be a leader in 
the field for years to come.  After all, Israeli exports of water products have tripled in five 
years, reaching a value of $2 billion in 2013 [66].  Undoubtedly, the Israeli administration 
would be open to sending their best products to the breadbaskets of the U.S. and the 
Black Sea in order to ensure their wheat supply through the drier future.
! In addition to water conservation technology, Israel could apply their innovative 
might to developing fertilizer conserving technology as well.  Currently and to our 
knowledge, no substitute for phosphorus exists, but perhaps Israel could invent new 
ways to synthesize it into usable fertilizers.  The same goes for Potassium based 
fertilizers.  Sources from which they are made are finite—and running out—but perhaps 
different source material could be utilized if innovations were made in fertilizer 
synthesis.  If not, Israel already utilizes proper fertilizer monitoring systems that 
conserves fertilizer, reducing the total amount needed per acre [67].  Conservation and 
efficiency will likely need to become paramount in Israel, given that their population is 
expected to grow from just over 8 million to around 11.4 million by 2035.  Somehow, 
they’ll have to do more with less.
! In terms of combating political destabilization in the Black Sea Basin, Israel has 
their hands tied.  Supporting one side of the conflict in order to bring it to an end would 
also sever friendly ties to the other.  Should they interfere, they may lose one of their 
major grain suppliers.  Desertification of the two breadbaskets is another lost cause.  A 
full blown assault by Israel on U.S., Ukrainian, and Russian agricultural practices which 
stimulate desertification is unlikely at best.  Israel can, however, distribute the 
agrochemical products they produce to their supplying nations in an effort to revitalize 
the soil.  This, of course, is dependent on a reliable supply of the agrochemical source 
material.
! Israel lacks well publicized policy directly addressing food security in the case of 
an acute food shortage.  Should this ever occur, it does have an advanced 
transportation network that could sufficiently distribute food aid to hungry regions, 
though.  While lacking emergency relief policy, Israel does recognize that wealth 
disparities within their population create a lack of access to food for the poorest 
demographics.  Joseph Shapira, State Comptroller of Israel, released a statement which 
explained that 900,000 Israelis had gone a whole day without food or had otherwise cut 
their intake due to poverty in 2011 [68].  In response to this startling statistic, Israel 
created a National Nutritional Security Council which advises the welfare minister in 
decision-making and policy planning.  Each year the council helps distribute the $200 
million set aside for food aid, where eligible families can apply and receive monthly 
allowances after their assets and expenditures are examined.  Food baskets and food 
voucher options are also being explored as options for food disbursement [68].  
Ethiopia
! As stated before, parts of Ethiopia will likely see a slight increase in yearly 
rainfall, but this amount won’t make the nation immune to drought.  Especially when the 
regions which are expected to receive less rain are considered.  12.7 million small-scale 
farmers[69] who depend on steady rains to grow the food that they eat and make a living 
from will likely experience years of low rainfall in the future [70].  Whats disconcerting is 
that famines usually follow droughts in Ethiopia, speaking to the nation’s overall 
vulnerability and dependency on reliable rains.  Some of this vulnerability could be 
circumvented with water-conserving irrigation systems, but nearly all of the farmland is 
rain-fed [71].  In this case, Ethiopia lacks resilience against droughts and water insecurity.
! It also lacks resiliency against soil nutrient deficiency.  Desertification plagues the 
country’s farmland, affecting 71.5% of the total land area [72].  Estimates from the FAO 
predict that Ethiopia will be unable to feed 44 million of its inhabitants by 2025 even with 
moderate inputs such as fertilizer [73].  Those estimates are also assuming that all arable 
land is used to grow food crops.  While an industrialized food production system with 
high inputs can avoid some of the downfalls of desertification, Ethiopia’s millions of 
small-scale farmers would likely find it hard locating the capital necessary to set up such 
a system.  For these reasons, Ethiopia lacks resiliency to desertification.  The 
government is well aware of their vulnerabilities to food shortages, though.  A history of 
deadly famines have spurred them to take steps in ensuring a system for crisis 
management.
! Ethiopia’s Ministry of Agriculture works with a number of institutions within the 
country to produce a heightened level of food security through enhancements to food 
production, food aid, and price stabilization.  To accomplish this, six major instruments 
are utilized:
1. Farm Modernization:  Through pilot credit schemes, programs to increase 
productivity, fertilizer production and use optimization projects, biotech studies, the 
promotion of soil conservation techniques, and the organization of farmers into more 
productive groups, the Agricultural Transformation Agency of Ethiopia is helping to 
modernize the nation’s agricultural sector.  It is a daunting task given the resources, 
but one that is mandated by the government nonetheless [38].
2. The Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR): This reserve of mostly wheat, 
maize and sorghum was built in 1972 following a severe famine as a means to 
replenish the supply of grains during food droughts.  It currently has a capacity of 
410,000 metric tons, although the capacity is expected to reach 3 million by the end 
of 2016.  Storage sites are located in regions prone to famine.  It operates by 
releasing the necessary quantity of food to the region in need, and orders a 
shipment of equal volume right away as a means of replenishment.  The food 
released is done so with a promissory note ensuring this replenishment from an 
eligible donor agency like USAID, the EU, the WFP etc.  In this way, the EFSR can 
maintain a steady balance of food [38].
3. The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP):  This program is used as an early alert 
system against potential food calamities.  Funded by both the government and 
donors, the PSNP helps target the poorest of the population and provide either cash 
or food to those who qualify.  They also claims to help increase agricultural 
productivity and the program is seen as the backbone of safety net programs within 
the nation (IBRD 2011, p.33). (IBRD, Project Performance Assessment Report: 
Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Project. Report No.:62549, June 16, 2011)
4. Price Stabilization: As local stores of grains dwindle, prices will rise.  A measure 
employed to reduce this is the EGTE (Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise), which 
operates with world markets to pump a commodity into the market at a deflated 
price.  If action is needed on a shorter timeframe, the EGTE might borrow from 
Ethiopia’s own EFSR and use it as an injection instead.  These mechanisms, while 
necessary for price stabilization, can also come at a great loss to the Ethiopian 
government and national bank [38].
5. The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX): Although dealing more specifically with 
price insurance, the ECX operates as a market for farmers to bring their crops in to 
trade within a more transparent system.  The exchange has been very successful, 
with 17 warehouses trading approximately 60% of Ethiopian coffee, for example, at 
prices significantly higher than those before its establishment [38].
6. Financial Insurance and Mechanisms: Micro-credit programs have began to take 
hold in pockets of Ethiopia, although the aid is spread thin.  While providing vital 
investments into small farms, the system is also flawed in that it does little to market 
the extra crop yields or insure their sale at a certain price.  Government involvement 
has been generally devoid in micro-credit though, despite the substantial need.  The 
government does supply production credits to commercial farms, though.  In 
addition, a crop insurance system has been put in place.  Sponsored by a number of 
international firms originating from the U.S. and Switzerland, the program is 
available for a premium, or through ‘work for insurance’ arrangements.  The insured 
are compensated for losses as calculated through a weather-based index.  This is a 
novel system though and has yet to be proven to be fully successful [38].
Threats: Applied
! There is a great deal of uncertainty in how the future of global food security will 
play out.  Trade partnerships, alliances, food policies, regional climate differences, and 
many other elements will play large roles in how food production, distribution, and trade 
will take form in the future.  In the following section, the threats discussed for each 
country will be applied to the production and consumption levels of Ethiopia and Israel 
to get a notion of the magnitude of the threats.
Israel
! Israel is reliant on the global market to supply its grain.  The world grain prices, 
on the other hand, are subject to multiple phenomena, like regional droughts similar to 
the one occurring in the Midwestern U.S. right now.  Experts are already releasing 
warnings of another food crisis akin to the 2008 price spike caused by, among other 
things, reduced rice and wheat harvests induced by a 2005-2006 drought [74, 75].  In 
January of 2007, wheat prices stood at $196 per metric ton.  By March of 2008 the price 
had risen by 123%, reaching 439 dollars per metric ton [43].  Corn prices also rose 
between January of 2007 and June of 2008, from $165/metric ton to $287/metric ton; a 
74% increase [76].  This spike was seen as a result of droughts in wheat-producing 
regions, diminished reserves, rising oil prices, increased meat consumption, and the 
emergence of agro-fuels [75].  The coming crisis will likely be caused by corn shortages 
rather than wheat and rice shortages, but an increase in corn prices will likely also mean 
an increase in wheat prices, says food security expert Robert Thompson from the 
Chicago Council of Global Affairs [74].  
! Just like the 2008 crisis, many other factors will come into play.  Should grain 
producing nations begin to stockpile reserves in an effort of self preservation, the prices 
will rise even more.  If oil prices continue to rise, the high input production systems of 
the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia could easily begin demanding higher prices.  All the 
while, developing superpowers like China, India, and Brazil boast massive populations 
of growing middle classes that will demand higher volumes of meat and dairy products 
into the future, furthering the expansion of global grain demand and fueling high prices 
[77]. If the price of grains were to climb with a magnitude similar to that of the 2008 spike, 
Israel would be forced to double their budget for grain imports, more or less.  This 
burden could be partially shouldered by the government through subsidies, but 
generally price swings tend to be absorbed by consumers, usually affecting the nation’s 
poorest residents [79].  Using loose estimates based on values from the 2008 crisis, 
which essentially saw a doubling in food prices, Israel could see corn prices rise to 
$416/metric ton from the current $208, and wheat could rise to $612/metric ton from 
$306.  
! These potential jumps of the future will also likely be facilitated by rising fertilizer 
prices, as seen during the 2008 food crisis.  That being said, it is hard to estimate 
exactly how or when a shortage in fertilizer products will bring detrimental effects to the 
global food economy as discussed in earlier sections.  A study from MIT promotes that 
without fertilizer, farmers could expect to harvest only 50-71% of their original yields, as 
found in field studies from Kenya [78].  As soils around the world lose topsoil and become 
less productive, there will likely be increased use of fertilizer to make up for nutrient 
loss, though.  When this may occur is reliant on the agricultural practices and efforts in 
soil stewardship from the producing nations.  When the threshold will be passed, turning 
viable soil into unproductive dust is a mystery, just as much as when an extreme-
weather anomaly will render a harvest obsolete—or when or if political destabilization in 
the Black Sea Basin may cut off supplies of grain.  
! The three phenomenas’ obscurity should not write off their legitimacy, though.  
Political destabilization, climate change, and fertilizer scarcities are real threats to food 
supplies that have already become a reality and will likely remain as issues through this 
century.  As can be seen by the intense rise in vegetable prices following an Israeli 
winter storm, it is clear that local production of a staple Israeli food is certainly 
vulnerable to climatic swings.  Just from a single storm, local prices on fruits and 
vegetables are able to inflate by 200-400% [30].  What is especially troubling is the idea 
that any combination of these threats could occur simultaneously, resulting in a 
cumulative price increase, as well as a cumulated increase in food scarcity and hunger.
Ethiopia
! Food production and security issues that have persisted in Ethiopia for decades 
will likely continue for the next century, becoming more variable, but intense [63].  
Specifically, inconsistent rains  will continue to plague the agricultural lands, likely 
evolving into shorter, more intense storms that may provide large quantities of water, but 
also low retention and high erosion.  These intense rains have the power to cause 
severe floods that may destroy entire agricultural plots, while the dry periods between 
such events will degrade production yields.  In both the wet and dry seasons, then, 
Ethiopia’s croplands are under threat from both too dry and too wet of conditions.
! The U.N.’s Convention to Combat Desertification estimates that in the next 25 
years, the global food production system could suffer up to a 12% loss in productivity 
due to land degradation.  By their calculations, this could drive world food prices up by 
30% [80].  The area of land in Ethiopia that is threatened by desertification could easily 
see a decline in production.  What would be even more problematic is finding aid for the 
38.7% of the nation’s population that still lives below the poverty line [81].  This group will 
likely struggle to access foods they can afford in the midst of rising global food prices, 
especially if or when major stocks are bought by those countries which can better afford 
them, like Israel, for instance.  In extreme cases, even the aid or grain imports that do 
make it within the borders might have difficulty reaching those in need of it most.  With 
around 75% of Ethiopia’s farmers more than a day’s walk from the nearest road, it 
would be extremely difficult to reach the rural populations of Ethiopia [57].
! Increase in global grain prices do more than affect the major importers of grain 
and cereals, though.  As the prices rise worldwide, food aid levels drop from the 
developed world.  As the largest food aid donor of the world, the U.S. cut their efforts by 
more than half between 2000 and 2007 [82], the same period that saw an increase of 
global grain prices by 85% [43].  Should a food crisis drive prices up once again in the 
midst of a dry year for Ethiopia, the government might find that finding shipments of 
grains to replenish their EFSR will cost them dearly in the midst of their desperation.
Discussion 
! It is difficult to accurately quantify each of the threats in terms of food supply 
reduction or hunger rate growth for Israel and Ethiopia, but a trend does emerge that is 
useful.  The threats covered in each of the country’s profiles expose vulnerabilities that 
each nation’s food security is subject to.  While no threat is guaranteed to bring a 
specific loss by a specific time, the cumulated array of hazards suggest a future that will 
see many more food crises occur and an increase in food price volatility.  This is not a 
novel phenomena, though.  From 1960-1985, world food prices experienced booms and 
busts, increasing and decreasing by a factor of 80-120%—most commodities doubled 
(rice quadrupled) in price during the food crisis of the early 1970’s [83].  As noted by the 
International Food Policy Research Institutie (IFPRI) in their report titled “Reflections on 
the Global Food Crisis,” these price spikes were accompanied by sharp rises in fertilizer 
and energy costs as well.  Although not discussed intensively within this essay, rising 
fuel and energy costs do have major influence on rising food costs [84].  This essay was 
intentionally geared towards threats stemming from environmental issues, however the 
dwindling global oil reserves do represent a scarcity that will continue to influence global 
food prices.
! The Joint Institute for the Study of the Atmosphere and Ocean (JISAO) has data 
outlining drought levels in the Sahel region of Africa which show that during the same 
period of high food price volatility in the early 1970’s, low rain levels were plaguing 
Africa [85].  Rainfall levels in the U.S. were not lacking during the early 70’s, just before 
the crisis [86]; however, Ukraine was experiencing a multi-year dry spell from 1971-1974 
[87].  It almost goes without saying that rainfall differences between the grain producing 
regions of the world is expected through the future.  While these differences may sway 
the production that reaches international markets, regional droughts will have the power 
to disrupt local production in regions like Ethiopia and the Sahel as a whole.
! Decreased rainfall and an increase in fertilizer and fuel costs are seen as 
compounding drivers of the 2008 and 1970 food crises.  These crises doubled, tripled, 
and quadrupled major grain prices.  Should these same phenomena become a reality 
once more, a similar jump could very well occur.  But these aren’t the only threats.  
Increasing populations of global superpowers drives intense importation of staple 
goods, fertilizers, and energy despite rising food costs [83].  This drives prices up even 
higher as the global supply of commodities is quickly eaten up.  Global agricultural 
productivity has grown at a rate of around 2.3% for the last four decades, doubling 
every 30 years or so [88].  This figure stands comfortingly above the global population’s 
rate of growth of 1.14% [89].    That being said, a 2013 report from the Nature 
Communications journal indicates that yields might be experiencing a plateau, and 
suggests that food security projections are often overly optimistic in terms of yield gains 
[90].  This could prove troublesome as global population approaches 9 billion and arable 
lands become rarer and rarer.
! Political and social conflicts like the one between Ukraine and Russia may 
become more prevalent as countries vie for the remaining tracts of productive land 
across the globe.  Already, massive land grabs are occurring in Africa and the rest of the 
developing world that speak to the awareness of resource scarcities in the face of 
rocketing demand for food [91].  This continued strain on the world’s farms and fields 
could mean even more intense price spikes in the future, as well as overall increases in 
food prices that stick, instead of peak  as we saw with the 1970 crisis.  We are getting a 
taste of this now, where food prices have yet to return to their levels before the 
beginning of the price hike in 2008 [92].
! In summary, should a number of threats become reality, the following increases 
in prices could result, based on the historical trends and literature focused on food 
crises as discussed above.  The threat of drought on producing regions has the power 
to raise global prices on staple food commodities by a factor of 2-4 and, in Ethiopia’s 
case, necessitate increased imports or food aid.  Israel would be hit the hardest by 
swollen global prices, while Ethiopia would have some support from local production.  
Climatic swings and anomalies, including floods and winter storms, have the power to 
wipe out entire crops, increasing local prices by another factor of 2-4.  Desertification 
could reduce supply of farmland and therefore food to an extent that brings a 30% rise 
in prices.  Political destabilization of the Black Sea Basin could cut off supply chains, 
forcing trade partners like Israel into sourcing their staple grains from other sources who 
would undoubtedly be aware of the stifled competitor and increase prices in light of 
increased scarcity.
! Should fertilizers become increasingly rare as expected, their prices will likely 
rise sharply as seen during the 2008 food crisis.  This will cause food prices to rise 
directly, or perhaps force farmers to halt their uses, which in turn would decrease 
production down to 50-71% of its original volume, thereby also increasing prices 
through reduced supply.  The U.S., Ukraine, and Russia’s input intensive grain 
producing economies will be severely affected should this happen, potentially creating a 
global price spike or grain shortage unlike anything seen before.  While this alone could 
easily increase prices by a factor of 2, investors in the futures markets of global food 
trade could exacerbate this further.  Food economy-savvy investors will likely have the 
resources and aptitude to monitor fertilizer prices and the fertilizer industry as a whole.  
Should they see a shortage coming (from any of these threats, really), they could drive 
prices up through intensive investing in futures markets.  This phenomena was seen as 
one of the main drivers of the 2008 food crisis [93].
Two Scenarios
! The prices of food depend on a large array of factors that essentially affect two 
activities: production and distribution.  Droughts, climate anomalies, fuel costs, nutrient 
deficiency and desertification affect production levels.  Political stability (or lack thereof), 
inadequate distribution networks, and future markets affect distribution and access.  
These all have multiplying effects, but not of the same magnitude.  Shortcoming of 
production are the ultimate drivers of supply, and carry heavy influence on pricing, or in 
Ethiopia’s case, the level of hunger.  In the table below, I have summarized the potential 
effects of each of the threats outlined in this essay and made estimates in quantifying 
these effects in two scenarios.  The first is one in which the threats become realities with 
a smaller intensity, either through chance or with the help of government and/or 
institutional intervention.  The second scenario outlines a harsher reality in which the 
threats to food security have a greater influence on pricing and production and little 
institutional intervention takes place.  These scenarios represent future possibilities, not 
predictions.
Threats Israel Ethiopia
Mild Scenario 
with 
Governmental 
and Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional Relief
Mild Scenario with 
Governmental and 
Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme 
Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional 
Relief
Drought Cost of staple 
goods (Grains, 
Fruits, Vegetables) 
double due to 
drought in either 
Israel or in the 
grain producing 
nations.  Israel’s 
population suffers 
from higher food 
costs and 
increased poverty.
Cost of staple 
goods (Grains, 
Fruits, Vegetables) 
quadruple due to 
drought in either 
Israel or in the grain 
producing nations.  
Israel’s population 
suffers immensely 
from higher food 
costs and much 
higher levels of 
poverty.
Local production of 
food suffers lower 
yields.  The 
Ethiopian 
government delivers 
emergency reserves 
and imports food 
aid for nation’s 
poorest 
demographics.  
Prices of staple 
good double.  Mild 
famine occurs.
Local food 
production 
essentially 
collapses.  
Governmental 
food aid is 
insufficient in 
making up the 
difference.  
Massive fatalities 
occur, 
exacerbated by 
civil unrest and 
compounded by 
mass migrations.
Threats Israel Ethiopia
Mild Scenario 
with 
Governmental 
and Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional Relief
Mild Scenario with 
Governmental and 
Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme 
Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional 
Relief
Populatio
n
Political 
Destabiliz
ation of 
the Black 
Sea Basin
Populations 
continue grow but 
are leveled off 
through education 
campaigns and 
human 
development.  
Pressures on 
limited resources 
increases price 
volatility 
moderately.
Populations 
continue grow at 
historical rates.  
Pressures on 
limited resources 
increases intensely, 
causing extreme 
price volatility as 
consumption 
continues to rise 
and stocks 
dwindle.
Although less of an 
issue for Ethiopia, 
population 
pressures could still 
spur resource 
competition.  
Human 
development and 
economic 
sophistication might 
decrease population 
growth.  Only slight 
increases in food 
prices over time 
occur as demand 
grows.
Population growth 
rate remains on 
par with the rest 
of the developing 
world, spurring 
large increases in 
rural and urban 
populations.  
Food pressures 
increase, 
necessitating 
higher volumes of 
food aid.  
Domestic food 
prices rise.
The Israeli 
government 
foresees political 
destabilization, 
securing stronger 
trading partners as 
alternatives.  The 
new food supply 
chain is set before 
the old one 
collapses, muffling 
the price shock to 
more reasonable 
levels.
The Israeli 
government does 
little to prepare 
before trade in 
Black Sea staple 
grains is stifled.  
The global grain 
market becomes 
aware of the 
immediate increase 
in demand and 
responds with 
higher prices.  
Israel’s population 
suffers from and 
intense increase in 
staple grain prices.
N/A N/A
Threats Israel Ethiopia
Mild Scenario 
with 
Governmental 
and Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional Relief
Mild Scenario with 
Governmental and 
Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme 
Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional 
Relief
Desertific
ation
Fertilizer 
Price 
Bump
Decreased farming 
intensity slows 
desertification, but 
doesn’t halt it. 
Yields in fruits and 
vegetables 
decrease, bringing 
higher food prices, 
shrunken exports, 
and a lowered 
agricultural GDP. 
Desertification of 
grain producing 
nations could 
decrease yields 
and exports, 
increasing global 
grain and 
commodity prices 
by 30% [94].
Israel and the grain 
producing nations’ 
vulnerable soils 
continue to be 
farmed intensively, 
causing extreme 
desertification.  
Farm productivity 
drops by 50% [94].  
Prices rise to levels 
unseen in history.  
Extreme food 
shortage in Israel 
causes fatal famine 
for country’s 
poorest 
demographics.  
Worldwide famines 
claim millions of 
lives.
More sustainable 
farming methods 
are adopted which 
replenish soil health. 
The degraded area 
of arable land is 
reduced from its 
current standing of 
85%.  Increased 
productivity occurs 
in some areas while 
desertification 
intensifies in others.  
Total food supply 
loss is variable, 
ranging from 
10-50% [94].
Ethiopia’s already 
degraded soils 
are continued to 
be farmed 
employing 
unsustainable 
practices.  
Degradation 
intensifies and 
expands, resulting 
in extreme crop 
yield losses of 
50% or above [94].
Potash and 
Phosphorus 
resource 
management 
improves; fertilizer 
prices rise slowly 
but steadily, lifting 
food prices with 
them.  Organics or 
other substitutes 
begin to take over 
as economically 
efficient 
alternatives.  Israel 
suffers moderately 
from increasing 
staple food prices 
over time and only 
severely during 
food crises when 
agribusinesses 
raise prices as 
food demand 
spikes.
The resources 
necessary for 
fertilizer synthesis 
are exhausted 
nearly completely.  
Purchasing of 
fertilizers becomes 
economically 
inefficient for 
farmers.  Crop 
yields shrink to 
50-71% of their 
original volumes.  
Global food crises 
follow, causing 
extreme increases 
in staple food 
prices, famines 
among the global 
poor, including 
Israel.  Fatalities 
occur in the 
millions.
Ethiopia continues 
to utilize non-input 
intensive farming 
techniques.  
Fertilizer price 
bumps affect the 
nation only in food 
crisis years when 
they must import 
grains from the 
global market that 
are subject to 
fertilizer prices.  
Ethiopia’s 
agricultural sector 
becomes more 
dependent on 
fertilizer use.  
Carrying capacity 
increases with 
production, then 
crashes as 
fertilizer prices 
become 
unattainably high. 
Food shortages 
prevail on a scale 
unknown.
Threats Israel Ethiopia
Mild Scenario 
with 
Governmental 
and Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional Relief
Mild Scenario with 
Governmental and 
Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme 
Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional 
Relief
Inadequat
e 
Distributi
on 
Network
N/A N/A Government 
sponsored projects 
and those run by 
outside investors 
help to connect the 
nation through an 
extensive railway 
system.  Roadways 
continue to be 
insufficient means 
for reaching rural 
populations.  During 
famines, food aid 
fails to reach the 
most obscure 
demographics, 
increasing the 
amount of fatalities 
only in extreme 
situations of 
urgency.  Some aid 
from organizations 
like the Red Cross 
may assuage this 
issue through air 
transport and 
additional aid 
delivery.
Railways fail to be 
built.  Roadways 
are inefficient 
distribution 
networks for food 
aid.  Large 
sections of the 
population are 
unreachable in 
time to save.  
Future famines 
have devastating 
effect on rural 
populations.
Threats Israel Ethiopia
Mild Scenario 
with 
Governmental 
and Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional Relief
Mild Scenario with 
Governmental and 
Institutional 
Intervention
Extreme 
Scenario 
Lacking 
Institutional 
Relief
Climate 
Anomalie
s (Floods, 
Winter 
Storms, 
etc.)
Continued 
agricultural 
research brings 
winter resistant 
and other harsh-
climate resistant 
varieties of crops 
which partially 
withstand harsh 
weather events.  
Some more 
extreme events 
occur; price 
volatility persists.  
Food prices 
double during 
anomaly years.
Technological 
innovation is 
unsuccessful in 
producing varieties 
able to withstand 
harsh weather 
events.  Climatic 
anomalies continue 
into the future, 
causing prices to 
increase by factors 
of 2-4.
Farm modernization 
through Ethiopian 
and international 
programs help 
protect the 
productive lands, in 
part, from extreme 
weather events.  
Regional events 
nonetheless reduce 
or wipe out certain 
harvests.  Food 
prices double.  Mild 
to moderate famine 
ensues.
Ethiopia’s 
agriculture does 
nothing to prepare 
against harsh 
climatic swings 
and volatility.  
Extreme events 
have devastating 
effects on regional 
yields.  Food 
shortages occur, 
causing prices to 
increase by a 
factor of 4.  
Massive, severe 
famines ensue.
Conclusion
! These threats, both mild and severe, will take serious tolls on the nations’ 
economies, hunger levels, poverty levels, and social and political stability.  There is 
evidence that such effects can have extreme transformative effects to societies.  Broad 
conflicts emerge in times of scarcity, and they rarely stay within their borders.  The 
Pentagon’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review even admits that “Competition for 
resources, including energy and water, will worsen tensions in the coming years and 
could escalate regional confrontations into broader conflicts – particularly in fragile 
states.” [95]  It remains to be seen how the international community will respond to 
shortages that destabilize governments and societies as a whole.  Hopefully, the crises 
that come will supply ample time to form alternative plans and sustainable alternatives.  
Cuba was able to rise from the ashes, given their ample supply of rain and good soil; 
perhaps other nations will be able to as well.  
! Then again, maybe not.  In a nation where their soil is completely degraded, 
years are necessary for remediation.  Many of the threats have long lasting or 
irreversible effects.  Once our phosphorus and potassium reserves (the elements 
necessary for synthesizing fertilizer) are exhausted, the additional productivity gleaned 
from them also disappears forever.  After a massive drought induced famine, the 
abandoned fields will not suddenly explode into productivity.  It might be that the coming 
food crisis will be much like climate change in that we cannot avoid the worst of it 
without acting decades in advance.  It might be that when disaster strikes, all options 
have run out for the future’s generations.  They will be forced to face the collective 
inaction that gripped the generation before us.  For now, we face an uncertain future.
! Research could be executed in a few fields which would help immensely.  I 
believe intense examination of past food crises‘ causes, effects, and repercussions will 
help provide a clearer image of what is to come.  Sociological research exploring the 
nature of humanity’s preference to reactivity rather than proactivity would also be 
helpful.  Should the conclusion be made that the coming food crises do indeed require 
action decades in advance of their arrival, it could be that this global dilemma is only 
avoidable through the spurring of societal motivation.  Until we decide to act collectively, 
we may collectively suffer.
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